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SECURED CREDITORS IN WAGE EARNER
PROCEEDINGS: INTERPRETING THE
VALIDITY OF BANKRUPTCY RULE 13-307(d)
I. Introduction
On October 1, 1973 the Supreme Court promulgated rules' pre-
scribing the practice and procedure to be followed in cases and
proceedings governed by Chapters I-VII and Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter "Act").' The procedural changes are
extensive, permeating every stage of straight bankruptcy and Chap-
ter XIII Wage Earner proceedings.3 One of the more important rules
is Bankruptcy Rule 13-307(d), 4 which deals with claims of secured
creditors in Wage Earner proceedings under Chapter XIII. The rule
provides:5
If a secured creditor files a claim, the value of the security interest held by
him as collateral for his claim shall be determined by the court. The claim
shall be allowed as a secured claim to the extent of the value so determined
and as an unsecured claim to the extent it is enforceable for any excess of
the claim over such value . . .
Secured creditors have challenged the validity of Rule 13-307(d),
claiming that the rule modifies the secured party's substantive right
to full recovery of the contract price.' Thus, they allege that it is a
substantive rule of law and outside the Supreme Court's rulemaking
power.7 Various courts have made conflicting decisions.8 The resolu-
tion of this issue will have significant impact on future creditor-
purchaser relations and on the future of Chapter XIII Wage Earner
proceedings as a viable alternative to straight bankruptcy. A better
understanding of the status of the secured creditor in this area of
bankruptcy law requires a discussion of the legislative history be-
1. Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U.S. 989 (1973).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1200 (1970).
3. See text accompanying notes 9-11 infra.
4. Bankruptcy Rules, 11 U.S.C. Rule 13-307(d) (Supp. V 1975).
5. Id.
6. In re McKee, 416 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
7. Id. at 653-54.
8. Compare In re Moralez, 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975) with In re Wall, 403 F.
Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975). See also In re Garcia, 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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hind Chapter XIII and the Bankruptcy Rules, and a review of the
most recent post-rule cases.
II. Chapter XIII
Congress enacted Chapter XIII of the Act to ameliorate the harsh
results and unsatisfactory solutions of a straight bankruptcy., Chap-
ter XIII relief is available to anyone whose principal income is de-
rived from wages, salary or commissions, I0 and who is unable to pay
his debts as they mature." It allows a debtor relief to liquidate debts
out of future earnings, without requiring a liquidation of assets. 2
Thus, it enables such a wage earning debtor to avoid the stigma and
loss of property which accompany a straight bankruptcy discharge.
There are numerous reasons why the Chapter XIII Petition is a
highly desirable method of debtor relief for individuals. 3 The debtor
will be able to retain the property which constitutes the creditor's
security, rather than relinquish all of his non-exempt property to a
trustee in Bankruptcy.' 4 There must be an allocation of future in-
come among creditors, 5 but the debtor is protected from lawsuits,
wage garnishments, and levies of execution by creditors holding
non-dischargeable claims." While the Act prohibits a debtor who
receives a discharge in straight bankruptcy from receiving another
discharge within six years,' there is no such prohibition under a
Chapter XIII plan. 8 Nevertheless, a conflict arises between the im-
9. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 52-55 (1937).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1970).
11. Id. at § 1023.
12. Id. at § 1001-86.
13. A report to the House of Representatives stated:
[Cihapter XIII provides a highly desirable method for dealing with the financial
difficulties of individuals. It creates an equitable and feasible way for the honest and
conscientious debtor to pay off his debts rather than having them discharged in bank-
ruptcy. The power of the court to change the amount and maturity of installment
payments without affecting the aggregate amount of such payments makes Chapter
XIII particularly applicable to the present day financial problems generated by heavy
installment buying.
H.R. REP. No. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
14. Property of the bankrupt is collected by the trustee in a straight bankruptcy under
the provisions of section 75(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 11 U.S.C. § 75(a) (1970).
15. Note, Effectuating the Purpose of Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act, 22 Maine L.
Rev. 401, 403 (1970).
16. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1014 (1970).
17. Id.
18. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
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plementation of these features of Chapter XIII and the wishes of a
secured creditor to reclaim his secured property, or realize full peri-
odic payments as specified in his contract with the debtor.
III. Pre-Rule Cases
Prior to the Bankruptcy Rules, courts which considered the role
of the secured creditor, often generated conflicting opinions.,9 Dif-
ferences arose out of the interpretation of section 652, the "dealt
with" clause of the Act, whereby every secured creditor whose claim
is "dealt with" must consent before a court can accept a Wage
Earner Plan.'" The manner in which courts interpreted this clause
determined the rights and status of the secured creditor and often
allowed such a creditor to destroy the viability of a Chapter XIII
plan.
A. The Strict Interpretation Cases
One line of cases, wherein courts strictly interpreted the "dealt
with" clause, basically held that a secured creditor was "dealt with"
if his contracts were in any way changed.2 These decisions prohib-
ited the acceptance of a Chapter XIII plan when there were non-
19. Compare In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp.
329 (D. Kans. 1962); In re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961) with In re Pizzolato, 268
F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967); In re Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963). See notes 21
and 25 infra.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1970).
21. See In re O'Dell, 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961). The court in that case held that a
Wage Earner Plan must provide full payments to all secured creditors according to the
contract terms. In O'Dell, the plan provided for a payment of $37 per week to a creditor whose
contract called for payment of $38. Id. at 390-91.
The court in In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962) rejected a plan which called
for payment of $27 per month to a partially secured creditor when the contract required $45
per month. Id. at 330.
In In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp. 819 (S.D. Ohio 1962), a partially secured creditor held a note
for $753 secured by furniture worth $300. Id. at 820. The court held that where a secured
creditor under the plan would not receive payment sufficient to meet the obligation of the
debtor according to the terms of the instrument creating the debt, the acceptance of that
secured creditor was necessary for confirmation of the Wage Earner Plan. Id. at 822. The case
is an example of the failure of most courts to distinguish between a partially secured and a
secured creditor.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933
(E.D. Ark. 1967), considered the failure of the Bankruptcy Court to provide for payment of
arrears within a specific time period as "dealing with" the creditor, since the extension varied
the contract from what the parties had agreed on. Id. at 934-35. See also Terry v. Colonial
Stores, 411 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1969).
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assenting secured creditors.2 They allowed even a partially secured
creditor to obtain full payment under the contract terms by using
the strength of his secured creditor status. 3 Apparently, these
courts considered the creditor's contract rights to be more important
than the formulation of a viable Wage Earner Plan. 4 This restrictive
approach severely limited the utility and operation of the Wage
Earner procedure.
B. The Less Restrictive 'Approach
Other courts adopted a more enlightened stance prior to the new
rules. They allowed the debtor under the Chapter XIII plan to mo-
dify a secured creditor's contract when it was necessary to preserve
the plan. 5 Specifically, these courts assumed that it was more equi-
table to subject the creditor to a slight delay in payment than to
destroy a Chapter XIII plan and possibly force a debtor into straight
bankruptcy." By construing the phrase "dealt with" as being synon-
ymous with the term "affected," the courts made use of section 607
of the Act,27 which states that "[a] creditor shall be deemed to be
affected by a plan only if his interest shall be materially and ad-
versely affected thereby."" The courts interpreted this section to
permit confirmation of a plan which modified a secured creditor's
payment rights if the objecting creditor's interest was not
"materially and adversely affected."29 Thus, one court applying this
approach believed that the court could use its injunctive power to
protect a plan which modified to some degree the provisions of an
22. See In re Rutledge, 277 F. Supp. 933, 934 (E.D. Ark. 1967); In re Pappas, 216 F. Supp.
819, 822 (S.D. Ohio 1962); In re Copes, 206 F. Supp. 329, 330 (D. Kan. 1962).
23. See 277 F. Supp. at 934-35; 216 F. Supp. at 822; 206 F. Supp. at 330.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. See In re Wilder, 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963). The court in Wilder allowed a
slight modification of a secured creditor's rights in order to preserve the Wage Earner Plan.
The court said that a two month delay did not seriously affect payments, and thus, the plan
was not impaired and the creditor's acceptance was not necessary for confirmation. Id. at 69.
In In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967), the court held that the delay of a
baloon payment was not sufficient to upset the entire Wage Earner Plan and possibly force
the debtor into straight bankruptcy. Id. at 357-58. See also In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp.
1113 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
26. See In re Thompson, 475 F.2d 1217, 1219 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1007 (1970).
28. Id.
29. Id.
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installment contract.'"
The rationale of this line of cases was that a secured creditor was
not "dealt with" by the plan unless it either limited the total
amount a secured creditor may recover or impaired his security
interest.3' The cases stressed that equitable considerations should
control when a creditor is technically, but not substantially, "dealt
with." Furthermore, these considerations could dictate that the
secured creditor be enjoined from enforcing his security interest if
reclamation of the collateral would destroy the Wage Earner Plan.3
By enjoining reclamation and by slightly modifying the timing of
the contract payments, this line of cases made the Chapter XIII
plan a viable device, and also maintained a reasonable position
towards the secured creditor. These equitable considerations
stressed in the "liberal" cases added another dimension to the judi-
cial interpretations of the statutory provisions of Chapter XIII. Yet,
even this line of cases did not make Wage Earner Plans feasible
when a plan "affected" a partially secured creditor, who by his veto
could destroy the viability of a plan. While the decisions were au-
thority for enjoining reclamation, they still required that an
"affected" creditor receive full payment in accordance with the con-
tract.34 Thus, for a Wage Earner Plan which involved a partially
secured creditor to be successful some other solution had to be pro-
vided; new Bankruptcy Rule 13-307(d) attempted to provide such
a solution.
IV. Chapter XIII Rules
Due to the increasing number of bankruptcy cases filed in federal
court each year,35 and the lack of uniform rules governing procedures
under the Act, a commission was established in 197031 to make
recommendations regarding rules and procedures in bankruptcy
30. In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997 (E.D. Va. 1940).
31. See In re Thompson, 475 F.2d 1217, 1218 (5th Cir. 1973); In reTeegarden, 330 F. Supp.
1113, 1114 (E.D. Ky. 1971); In re Pizzolato, 268 F. Supp. 353, 355 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
32. See 475 F.2d at 1218-19; 330 F. Supp. at 1115; 268 F. Supp. at 356.
33. See In re Thompson, 475 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1973). Again, the premise that it is more
equitable to subject the creditor to delay than to destroy the plan came into play. Id. at 1218-
19.
34. See notes 19-30 supra and accompanying text.
35. See Note, Debtors' Dilemma: Status of the Secured Creditor Under Chapter XIII of
the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U.Cal.D.L. Rev. 277, 278 (1971).
36. Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
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cases." On July 30, 1973 the Commission sent its report and recom-
mendations to Congress." The Supreme Court, pursuant to ena-
bling legislation,3" promulgated the new bankruptcy rules in Octo-
ber, 1973.40 These rules deal with practice and procedure alone, and
they may not enlarge, abridge or modify any substantive right.,, To
the extent that practice or procedural provisions of the Act conflict
with the rules, the rules supersede the Act4" and all of the general
orders in bankruptcy.43
The Chapter XIII rules require the valuation of security interests.
The need to codify this area of bankruptcy was imperative since no
reported Chapter XIII case ever differentiated between secured and
partially secured creditors." Both enjoyed the same rights. Courts
often referred to creditors as secured creditors regardless of the value
of the security held. As pre-rule cases demonstrated, the courts
permitted a partially secured creditor to prevent adoption of a pro-
posed plan by a single dissent. 5 Threatening to exercise his veto
power, the partially secured creditor could demand that the plan
provide for his payment in full, according to the terms of his con-
tract. This approach, which gave the partially secured creditor
much greater control over the debtor's property than his security
interest warranted," was inconsistent with the Act's underlying
37. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are the result of the same kind of process that
produced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
other rules of procedure prescribed for the federal judiciary. 403 F. Supp. 357, 359 (E.D. Ark.
1975).
38. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
40. The Rules for general bankruptcy (straight bankruptcy) and Chapter XIII (wage
earner proceedings) were published by the Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules in March and September 1971, with April 1, 1972 as the deadline for
comments. The Rules were approved by the Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure in October 1972 and by the Judicial Conference in November 1972. The Rules were
approved and promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 24, 1973, and were reported to
Congress on that date. The Rules became effective on October 1, 1973. 411 U.S. 989 (1973).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The order of the Supreme Court promulgating the new Rules, 411 U.S. 989 (1973),
abrogated the general orders and official forms of bankruptcy that it had previously instituted
for the governance of straight bankruptcies and Chapter XIII cases. Id. at 991.
44. See generally Comment, The Partially Secured Creditor Under Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 3 Prospectus 285 (1970).
45. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
46. A partially secured creditor is a secured creditor who has a security interest in collat-
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objectives of fairness and equity. This approach also defeated the
specific objective of Chapter XIII-that of providing a means of
relief and rehabilitation to the wage earner debtor. 7
The 1973 Chapter XIII rules allegedly provided a solution to this
problem. Rule 13-307(d) provides that the Bankruptcy Judge must
value the creditor's collateral to determine the extent to which a
creditor might be deemed secured. The Advisory Committee's
notes49 point out that the rule is merely an application of the general
bankruptcy requirement that in order to achieve a fair and equita-
ble distribution of the bankrupt's assets, a secured creditor, after
receiving full payment of the value of his security, can participate
in the general distribution for any amount remaining on his claim.5"
Under the new rules, any creditor whose claim exceeds the value
of his security interest, as outlined by 13-307(d), is said to be par-
tially secured.5' The partially secured creditor is then considered to
have two claims, one secured and the other unsecured.2 Thus, the
creditor should get exactly what he bargained for when he entered
into a security agreement; he would be a secured creditor to the
extent that he protected himself and an unsecured creditor for the
remainder left on the contract.53
eral which is worth less than the debt secured thereby. The partially secured creditor usually
has his security interest in rapidly depreciating collateral such as an auto, home furnishings,
or appliances which have a limited resale value. See 10 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 48-49 (14th ed.
1977).
47. H.R. REP. No. 193, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
48. Bankruptcy Rule 13-307(d) states:
If a secured creditor files a claim, the value of the security interest held by him as
collateral for his claim shall be determined by the court. The claim shall be allowed
as a secured claim to the extent of the value so determined and as an unsecured claim
to the extent it is enforceable for any excess of the claim over such value. For the
purposes of this subdivision the court may appoint an appraiser in the manner speci-
fied by and subject to the limitations of Bankruptcy Rule 606.
11 U.S.C. Rule 13-307(d) (Supp. V 1975).
49. Id.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1970).
51. 11 U.S.C. Rule 13-307(d) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Bankruptcy Rule 13-202(c) provides:
A creditor whose claim has been allowed in part as a secured claim and in part as
an unsecured claim shall be entitled to accept or reject a plan in both capacities unless
his secured claim is not dealt with by the plan, in which event he shall be entitled to
accept or reject only as an unsecured creditor.
11 U.S.C. Rule 13-202(c) (Supp. V 1975).
53. United States Nat'l Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28, 34 (1947).
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V. Post-Rule Cases
There are few reported cases on the validity of the new bank-
ruptcy rules and those that do exist have reached conflicting results.
The first reported case interpreting the rule was In re Garcia.5'
Here a secured creditor of an automobile rejected the Wage Earner
Plan and filed a complaint for reclamation of the car and for relief
from automatic stay of lien enforcement." The plan provided that
secured creditors should have priority over unsecured creditors up
to the actual value of their security."
The District Court for the Northern District of California valued
the 1973 Chevrolet at $2,850.11 The debtor owed a total of $4,372 on
the contract for the car.5 In accordance with Rule 13-307(d), the
court allowed the claim of G.M.A.C. as a secured creditor in the
amount of $2,850, and allowed the remaining amount ($1,522) as an
unsecured claim." The court stated that the rationale behind Rule
13-307(d) was common sense since: "[i]f GMAC were to have re-
possessed the automobile on the date of filing they could have real-
ized $2,850.00 on a resale, and they would have a deficiency as to
any excess, for which they would obviously be unsecured."6 The
court said that when contracts are entered into, parties are deemed
to know that the Act may override some provisions in the contract."
The court concluded that reclamation should be declined when:
(1) equitable considerations including the debtor's good faith favor
restraining foreclosure; (2) the injunction against foreclosure is nec-
essary to carry out the plan; and (3) the injunction does not impair
the security of the lien." In upholding the Rule, Judge Harry Wes-
tover cited pre-rule cases" as authority for reaching the result codi-
fied by the rule.6" The court felt that the trend in bankruptcy cases
54. 396 F. Supp. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
55. Id. at 519.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 521.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 525.
62. Id. at 523.
63. See note 25 supra.
64. 396 F. Supp. at 523. The court also noted that considerations which make it appropri-
ate to restrict the rights of a secured creditor to the economic depreciation of his collateral in
a Chapter X case should apply in a Chapter XIII case. Id. at 524. The court referred to
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is in the direction of restraining secured creditors if necessary to
rehabilitate the debtor. 5
One year later, the District Court for the Northern District of
California again interpreted the new bankruptcy rule in In re
Moralez.6 The debtors at the time of filing had an automobile which
was financed by the Wells Fargo Bank. 7 The agreed balance due
was $5,267.8 The car was valued under Rule 13-307(d) at $3,913.
The trustee informed Wells Fargo that he would honor the bank's
claim up to $3,913 and that the balance of $1,354 would be consid-
ered unsecured." The bank sought an order requiring the trustee to
maintain the contract payments until the $5,267 was paid. The
Bankruptcy Court granted the bank's motion and found that Rule
13-307(d) constituted a substantive change in the law thus exceed-
ing the Supreme Court's rule making power.7 °
The trustee in bankruptcy appealed, and the district court held
that the Rule was invalid7 since it modified a secured creditor's
substantive right to full performance of a secured installment con-
tract." The court concluded that the rule was outside the rule mak-
ing power granted the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2075. 7
The bankruptcy trustee claimed that, according to the Advisory
Committee's Notes to Rule 13-307(d), the Rule is merely an adapta-
tion of section 93(h),74 which prescribes certain valuation procedures
and thus is merely procedural.75 He argued that the Rule did not
Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 571 (4th Cir. 1963) as authority for
the premise that the parallel structure and common purposes of the Bankruptcy Chapters
should not be ignored and that the statutes which relate to the same persons or things or same
class may be regarded in pari materia.
65. 396 F. Supp. at 523.
66. 400 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
67. Id. at 1354.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1355.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 11 U.S.C. § 93(h) (1970) reads as follows:
The value of securities held by secured creditors shall be determined by converting
the same into money according to the terms of the agreement pursuant to which such
securities were delivered to such creditors. . . . Such determination shall be under the
supervision and control of the court.
75. 400 F. Supp. at 1354.
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modify the creditor's right to his security, but only adopted a proce-
dure for valuing the security." Judge Orrick rejected these argu-
ments. He concluded that section 93(h) is inapplicable to Chapter
XIII proceedings and thus Rule 13-307(d) does not incorporate the
procedural elements of section 93(h).77 He considered the Rule sub-
stantive and outside the Supreme Court's power.7"
In In re Wall,79 the District Court for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas also considered this substantive versus procedural issue. In
Wall a creditor claimed to have a secured debt in the amount of
$3,600 for a car."° The Bankruptcy Court, pursuant to Rule 13-
307(d), valued the car at $2,600.and said that monthly payments
under the contract would be reduced to pay the $2,600 over the
remaining contract term.8" The court concluded that the creditor
would not be affected by the plan even though it was to receive less
than the contract monthly payments."2
On appeal, the creditor urged that Rule 13-307(d) abridged a
substantive right since it impaired contract rights.83 Citing one line
of pre-rule cases, 4 the creditor contended that a Chapter XIII plan
cannot provide for less than full contract monthly payments to se-
cured creditors.85 The District Court for the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas disagreed.
The court approached the challenge to the Bankruptcy Rule by
considering the history of the Rules. Since the Supreme, Court
adopted the Rules after scrutiny by panels of outstanding experts
and review by Congress, the court believed that a strong presump-
tion exists that the Rules neither modified nor abridged any sub-
stantive rights.8" Judge Oren Harris pointed out the additional
strong presumption that had the Supreme Court "overstepped the
authority delegated by the Congress, such transgression would have
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1355.
78. Id.
79. 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
80. Id. at 358.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
85. 403 F. Supp. at 358.
86. Id. at 360.
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been noted and the offending rule modified or deleted upon re-
view." 7
The court also cited HFG Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co.,8 as laying
down the following rule of construction to deal with Bankruptcy
Rules:89
[t]he rules having been prescribed by the Supreme Court, as rules of proce-
dure under the limitation imposed by Congress that the substantive rights
of any litigant should not be altered, it would appear that one who asserts
that this rule (or any rule) deals with matters of substantive law rather than
procedure carries a heavy burden."
The court also concluded that, absent the Rule, it would have
followed the "liberal" pre-rule decisions." Thus, the result required
by the Rule would have been reached; the secured creditor would
have been enjoined from reclamation of the collateral, provided that
(1) the security was not impaired, (2) the injunction was necessary
to preserve the plan, and (3) equitable considerations favored the
injunction. The court believed that the creditor was not "adversely
dealt with" by the plan since reclamation and sale would leave him
with the same or greater unsecured debt."
The most recent case dealing with the validity of Rule 13-307(d)
is In re McKee.' The debtor there had a $5,800 balance due on a
car contract. Pursuant to Rule 13-307(d) the Bankruptcy Court val-
ued the car at $3,700.11 The District Court for the Eastern District
of Arkansas classified the creditor as a secured creditor to the extent
of the value of the collateral ($3,700) and as an unsecured creditor
for the balance." The issue raised was whether Rule 13-307(d), "by
restricting the secured creditor's right to either full contract pay-
ments or repossession of the collateral, falls outside the rulemaking
power of the Supreme Court .... , The creditor argued that a
87. Id.
88. 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947).
89. 403 F. Supp. at 359.
90. 162 F.2d 539.
91. 403 F. Supp. at 360. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text supra.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 416 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
95. Id. at 653.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 653-54.
NOTES19771 .129
130 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
substantive right was modified." Without much analysis, the dis-
trict court, citing Wall," upheld the validity of the Rule. 00
VI. Conclusion
The conflicting opinions concerning the rights of secured and par-
tially secured creditors are indicative of the uncertainty which still
prevails in many courts regarding the judicial function in Chapter
XIII proceedings. There is a balancing problem between the rights
of the creditors and the viability of the Wage Earner Plan. The
courts must balance three principles: first, impairment of contract
rights is the essence of our bankruptcy system; 0' second, the due
process clause of the Constitution compels preservation of the se-
cured and partially secured creditors' rights, 02 and thus, courts
must guarantee such creditors payment to the value of their secu-
rity; and third, the courts have an obligation to implement the
congressional purpose that Wage Earner Plans should succeed
whenever possible.0 3
In balancing these three principles, the courts should implement
all Wage Earner Plans which properly preserve a secured and par-
tially secured creditor's interest in his collateral. In granting the
creditor the value of his security, the creditor is getting what he
bargained for when the contract was made. 04
Most, if not all, wage earners filing under Chapter XIII have one
or more partially secured creditors. By ignoring the value of the
security and by relying on strict compliance with the contract
terms, courts seem to assume that, but for the, Wage Earner Plan,
98. Id. at 654.
99. 403 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Ark. 1975). See text accompanying notes 74-87 supra.
.100. 416 F. Supp. at 654.
101. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
102. U.S. CONST. amend V.
103. The court in In re Teegarden, 330 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. Ky. 1971), discussed the
constitutional problem as follows:
Congress has the power to regulate property rights and has exercised that power in the
form of the Bankruptcy Act. The Bankruptcy Act becomes a part of every contract
made, whether or not expressly stated in the contract . . a creditor should not have
a veto power over a wage earner's plan unless it can be shown that the plan is violative
of due process; that is to say constitutes a taking of property without due process.
Id. at 1115.
104. Collier suggests that if distribution in Chapter XIII is to be in the best interests of
all creditors, creditors should expect to receive no more than they would on liquidation. 9
Collier, Bankruptcy § 9.17 (14th ed. 1976).
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the contract payment would be forthcoming in the normal course of
events. 05 The more realistic view adopted by other courts recognizes
that the debtor's financial plight, and not the Wage Earner Plan,
renders the creditor's legal right to payment unenforceable. 08 Thus,
the rights to the security are the only rights of the secured creditor
which could be harmed by the plan, and the economic worth of such
rights depends on the value of the security. This is the view embod-
ied by Rule 13-307(d).
Consumer bankruptcy has become a growing social and economic
problem in the United States. The reasons for this are not obscure.
The expansion and change in the consumer credit field since World
War II has been revolutionary. The burgeoning growth of consumer
credit has been matched by a corresponding rise in the number of
consumer bankruptcies. Advertising has taught consumers that
cash is old-fashioned and that bankruptcy need not be a deterrent
to incurring a new debt. Thus, in an environment where credit is
easily obtained, more consumers will overextend themselves and
turn to Wage Earner Plans to salvage their finances.
Much of the modern consumer credit extended takes the form of
secured obligations, due to the widespread use of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the relative ease with which security interests
may be perfected under Article Nine of the Code. 07 The essence of
the consumer credit system is that credit is extended in reliance
upon and is expected to be paid from the debtor's future earnings.
The Chapter XIII Wage Earner Plan is one of the few methods
currently available which envisions the payment of past obligations
via promises to pay out of future earnings.' If the Wage Earner
105. As the court in Teegarden said:
If creditors had an absolute right to receive payments in accordance with the terms of
the contract . . . there would be no purpose served by wage earner's plans. If debtors
could satisfy their debts according to the terms of the contracts creating them, then
they would not need the benefits of a wage earner's plan.
330 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (E.D. Ky. 1971).
106. See note 25 supra.
107. See King, Some Thoughts on Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Bankruptcy Act, 72 Com. L. J. 203 (1967).
108. Alternative methods of relief which may be sought by the wage earning debtor in-
clude voluntary private debt adjustment with a budget planner or consolidation of debt by a
small loan. Chapter XIII has the advantages of continual judicial supervision of the plan and
the ability of the bankruptcy court to invoke its injunctive powers in dealing with creditors
rather than relying merely on persuasion. See Comment, Relief for the Wage-Earning Debtor:
Chapter XIII, or Private Debt Adjustment?, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 372 (1960).
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Plan is to remain a viable alternative to straight bankruptcy, the
courts must use Rule 13-307(d) in the spirit and for the purpose for
which it was promulgated.
In light of the history of Chapter XIII, any judicial interpretation
of Rule 13-307(d) which grants secured and partially secured credi-
tors payment in accordance with contractual terms, regardless of
the value of the security, is regressive and alien to the reasoning
behind the rule and to the concept of equity which underlies the
rehabilitative proceedings of Chapter XIII.
Jane E. Finkel
